Abstract
We consider the strategic interaction of traders in a continuous-time financial market with Epstein-Zin-type recursive intertemporal preferences and performance concerns. We derive explicitly an equilibrium for the finite player and the mean-field version of the game, based on a study of geometric backward stochastic differential equations of Bernoulli type that describe the best replies of traders. Our results show that Epstein-Zin preferences can lead to substantially different equilibrium behavior.
Publication
Accepted for publication in Finance and Stochastics
Assistant Professor of Economics
Greetings! I hold concurrent appointments as an Assistant Professor at Collegio Carlo Alberto and within the Department of Economics, Social Studies, Applied Mathematics and Statistics (ESOMAS) at the University of Turin. My academic focus is centered on economic theory and applied mathematics, with a particular emphasis on decision theory. I lead the FIS 3 project “Assessing Climate Change Risk: The Welfare Implications of Long-Run Temperature Variations.”