Abstract
I study the ex-ante aggregation of preferences of Bayesian agents in a purely subjective framework. I relax the assumption of a Bayesian social preference while keeping the Pareto condition. Under a simple axiom that relates society’s preference to those of the agents, I obtain an additively separable representation of society’s preference. Adding an ambiguity aversion axiom I obtain a representation that resembles the Smooth Ambiguity Criterion of Klibanoff et al. (2005). I then briefly consider applications of this framework to inequality and treatment choice under ambiguity.
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Lorenzo Maria Stanca
Assistant Professor of Economics
Greetings! I hold concurrent appointments as an Assistant Professor at Collegio Carlo Alberto and within the Department of Economics, Social Studies, Applied Mathematics and Statistics (ESOMAS) at the University of Turin. My academic focus is centered on economic theory, with a particular emphasis on decision theory.