Lorenzo Maria Stanca
Lorenzo Maria Stanca
CV
Publications
Working papers
Teaching
Contact
Source Themes
Foundations of ambiguity models under symmetry: α-MEU and smooth ambiguity
A novel axiomatization of the smooth ambiguity model and the α-maximin expected utility criterion in a common setting under symmetry.
Smooth aggregation of Bayesian experts
An axiomatization of the smooth ambiguity model in a social choice setting.
A simplified approach to subjective expected utility
An axiomatization and generalization of Savage's theorem using functional analysis with applications to decision theory.
Coming Soon: Strategic Ambiguity, Moral Hazard, and the Optimal Deterrence Strategy
Provide a game theoretic explanation of Strategic Ambiguity, that is deliberately creating uncertainty in Beijing and Taipei about whether the United States would intervene in a war, by means of the decision-theoretic notion of Ambiguity.
«
Cite
×