Lorenzo Maria Stanca
Lorenzo Maria Stanca
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Publications
Type
Journal article
Preprint
Date
2024
2023
2022
2021
2020
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Lorenzo Maria Stanca
(2024).
NEW Working Paper: Recursive Preferences, Correlation Aversion, and the Temporal Resolution of Uncertainty
.
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Lorenzo Maria Stanca
,
Emy Lecuyer
,
Frank Riedel
(2024).
NEW: Arbitrage Pricing in Convex, Cash-Additive Markets
.
PDF
Lorenzo Maria Stanca
,
Giulio Principi
,
Massimo Marinacci
(2024).
New version: Recursive Preferences and Ambiguity Attitudes
.
PDF
Lorenzo Maria Stanca
,
Francesco Fabbri
,
Giulio Principi
(2024).
NEW: Absolute and Relative Ambiguity Attitudes
.
PDF
Lorenzo Maria Stanca
(2024).
Working Paper: Restricted Dynamic Consistency
.
PDF
Lorenzo Maria Stanca
,
Adam Brandenburger
,
Paolo Ghirardato
,
Daniele Pennesi
(2024).
Working Paper: Event Valence and Subjective Probability
.
PDF
Lorenzo Maria Stanca
,
Jodi Dianetti
,
Frank Riedel
(2024).
Working Paper: Optimal consumption and investment under relative performance criteria with Epstein-Zin utility
.
PDF
Lorenzo Maria Stanca
,
Simone Cerreia-Vioglio
,
Fabio Maccheroni
,
Massimo Marinacci
,
Luigi Montrucchio
(2024).
Working Paper: Affine Gateaux Differentials and the von Mises Statistical Calculus
.
PDF
Lorenzo Maria Stanca
(2023).
Robust Bayesian Choice
. Mathematical Social Sciences, 126.
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DOI
Lorenzo Maria Stanca
,
Giulio Principi
,
Mario Ghossoub
(2023).
Working Paper: A Nonlinear Sandwich Theorem
.
PDF
Lorenzo Maria Stanca
,
PeterKlibanoff
,
Sujoy Mukerji
,
Kyoungwon Seo
(2022).
Foundations of ambiguity models under symmetry: α-MEU and smooth ambiguity
. Journal of Economic Theory, 199.
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DOI
Lorenzo Maria Stanca
(2021).
Smooth aggregation of Bayesian experts
. Journal of Economic Theory, 196.
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DOI
Lorenzo Maria Stanca
(2020).
A simplified approach to subjective expected utility
. Journal of Mathematical Economics, 87.
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DOI
Lorenzo Maria Stanca
,
Michael Porcellacchia
(0001).
Coming Soon: Strategic Ambiguity, Moral Hazard, and the Optimal Deterrence Strategy
.
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